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GENDER AND NONFINANCIAL MATTERS IN THE ALI PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION
KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH*

I. INTRODUCTION
The question for this issue is gender issues in the American Law Institute’s
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution. Overall, the Principles are an impressive effort to create clarity and coherence, given the disorganized and evolving
state of family law. This commentary raises a few questions about the Principles’
treatment of nonfinancial issues, and suggests that this treatment should raise
concerns about women’s interests upon divorce. First, I will briefly review the
ALI’s position on nonfinancial matters. Second, I will discuss why the limitation
to financial losses should matter to women; that is, I will investigate the costs of
excluding nonfinancial losses. Finally, I will consider the two reasons given for
this limitation in the Principles’ section on compensatory losses, where the issue
is most directly addressed. Those reasons are incommensurability (or the problem of valuation), and avoiding fault determinations. Neither is sufficient to
sustain the exclusion of nonfinancial matters, once their importance is understood.
II. THE ALI’S POSITION ON NONFINANCIAL MATTERS
The ALI Principles take the general view that courts should only be author1
ized to settle financial matters. This view is reflected in numerous provisions of
the Principles, but three examples should suffice.
A. Compensatory Payments
Section 5.02 sets out the purpose of the compensatory payments: “to allocate financial losses that arise at the dissolution of a marriage . . . . Losses are al2
located under this Chapter without regard to marital misconduct . . .” The use
of the term “financial losses” is explicitly intended to limit the relevant inquiry
so as to exclude nonfinancial losses. Comment b to Section 5.02 is devoted to
explaining this omission, and contrasts financial losses and gains with “emoCopyright © 2001 by Katharine B. Silbaugh.
* Professor of Law, Boston University. I would like to thank Jack Beermann for a helpful discussion of this subject.
1. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 5.02,
5.06 (Proposed Final Draft Part 1, 1997) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES 1997]. The largest exception, of
course, is that courts are also authorized to decide child custody matters.
2. Id. § 5.02.
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tional losses and emotional gains.” There are two reasons given for the exclusion. First, Comment b tells us that financial losses and emotional losses are
“not commensurable” and therefore “there is no method for determining the
extent to which compensation for financial loss should be reduced or enlarged
to reflect nonfinancial gains or losses.” Second, Comment b reminds us that
looking at marital conduct might draw us into the fault inquiry that the Princi4
ples disavow.
B. Fault
In the introduction to the Principles, Topic 2 discusses the ALI’s position on
the role of “marital misconduct” in assessing property and maintenance
5
awards. Acknowledging that state law actually varies on this point, the Principles opt not to stay neutral, but seek to eradicate any evaluation of marital con6
duct from dissolution proceedings. The Principles argue that the most extreme
forms of misconduct are compensable in tort, though they caution that the use of
7
this remedy should be rare. The mainstream financial settlement at divorce, according to the Principles, should not reflect any evaluation of the particular mar8
riage exchange. The Principles defend this position, in brief, in the following
manner: “The position taken by the Principles on this question follows from both
the goal of improving the consistency and predictability of dissolution law, and
the core tenet that the dissolution law provides compensation for only the finan9
cial losses arising from the dissolution of marriage.”
Notice that ignoring fault is justified in part on the basis of the principle of
compensation only for financial losses. In Section 5.02 Comment b, the limitation
to financial losses is justified as consistent with the desire to eradicate fault from
10
the inquiry. This is a circle in justification that requires more excavation. Fault,
based as it is in misconduct, need not be entirely identical to nonfinancial losses
and gains. More will be said about this below.
C. Premarital Agreements
One more example will suffice. Chapter 7, governing Marital Agreements,
11
effectively limits premarital agreements to financial issues. While it allows for
enforceable premarital agreements generally, subject to common state law concerns over fairness, it has several provisions addressing the terms that are negotiable. Section 7.12 prevents couples from gaining enforcement of agreements
that hinge financial settlements on marital conduct, unless state law already ef-

3. Id. § 5.02 cmt. b.
4. Id.
5. Id. Introduction at 14.
6. Id. at 28.
7. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 1, at 30-31.
8. Id. at 14.
9. Id.
10. Id. § 5.02 cmt. b.
11. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, § 7
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2000) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES 2000].
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fectively provides fault-based distributions of wealth. That is to say, a couple
may not reach an enforceable agreement on the price of the exchange of nonfinancial benefits within their marriage. Under Section 7.12, a couple may not restrict their access to divorce by agreement, or financially penalize a spouse who
13
seeks a divorce. Through these restrictions, the Principles reflect the notion that
nonfinancial issues will not receive legal rights within dissolution law, even
when the couple desires otherwise. One of the reasons expressed in the Com14
ments is the general policy of eliminating inquiries into fault. In effect, this
means that even consensual premarital agreements will govern property settlements and alimony only—the financial issues—and cannot lead to an investigation and settlement of nonfinancial issues, such as those reflected in the prohibited terms in Section 7.12.
III. THE GENDER PROBLEM WITH THE TREATMENT OF NONFINANCIAL
LOSSES AND GAINS
Financial issues cannot be isolated from nonfinancial issues. This problem
15
is of particular concern to women. The family economy is constructed out of
the exchange of numerous financial and nonfinancial contributions, including
16
but extending far beyond the care of dependents. Women’s contributions are
systematically not valued or undervalued when it comes time to decide what is
legally relevant and compensable in family law. There are significant and constant exchanges within marriage of love, counseling, sex, emotional support,
entertainment, money, and unpaid labor. It is a particular theory to posit, as the
Principles seem to do, that the financial and the nonfinancial operate in separate
negotiations, and law can only effectively be concerned with the financial issues.
In the nineteenth century, the provision of services, including both labor
17
and affection, was an explicit exchange for financial support. These were the
complimentary obligations of marriage, and it would have been unthinkable to
believe they were not interrelated. The Principles excise the financial from the
18
nonfinancial. Here, the financial and the nonfinancial exchanges in marriage
have taken on entirely different forms. Their separation seems to rest on the ease
of legal intervention to settle scores on the financial front, contrasted with the
supposed impossibility of settling scores on the nonfinancial front. The meaning
of this distinction is that financial contributions and losses give rise to legal
rights, and nonfinancial ones cannot. If nonfinancial incidents of marriage are
not legally relevant, contrasted with the legal relevance afforded financial ones,
nonfinancial contributions are higher risk investments and there is legal bias
12. Id. § 7.12.
13. Id.
14. Id. at cmt. b.
15. For a fuller exposition of this point, see Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the
Family Economy, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 65 (1998).
16. The Principles allow a limited payment for the care of dependents, but it is not measured
against the benefits conferred by the care, only the earning capacity losses resulting from it. ALI
PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 1, § 5.06.
17. Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives’ Rights to
Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 Geo. L. J. 2127 passim (1994).
18. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 1, § 5.02 cmt. b.
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against them. Those who contribute more of them (on average women) will find
their contributions unrecognized by the law. This bias is compounded by the
Principles’ insistence on settling only post-divorce losses, leaving untouched any
19
inequalities occurring during the marriage.
Ignoring nonfinancial losses might not matter to a gender analysis if we assume that the nonfinancial give-and-take is equal as between men and women—
that there is nothing systematic about it. If that assumption turns out to be
wrong, then leaving nonfinancial issues out of the equation has a potential gender bias in it (in one direction or the other). In fact there is reason to think that
nonfinancial investments by women are greater, on average. The Principles do
admit that there is a potential systemic impact in that they provide for earning
20
capacity losses associated with the care of children and the elderly. Here the
ALI recognizes in a limited sense that there is sex role division of some kind in
most marriages, or in enough marriages to warrant attention. To take no account of unpaid caregiving labor within the family would systematically affect
women, and the Principles reflect the recognition courts have given to this
21
truth.
Caregiving labor is the only nonfinancial issue the ALI addresses. But, the
ALI expresses even this issue as though its only relevance is its effects on finances; the only legally recognizable result of caring for dependents is an earn22
ings capacity loss. Put another way, caregiving labor’s only legally relevant effect is its impact on the caregiver’s ability to earn money in the wage labor
market. That loss of the all important wage-earning ability requires compensa23
tion under the ALI. But doesn’t caring for the family produce gains and losses
to individuals other than the loss it admittedly inflicts on the caregiver’s wageearning capacity? Gains are conferred by caregiver-spouses to wage-earner
spouses through parenting as well; the opportunity to parent gives great pleas24
ure, whether a child is absent or present, a minor or an adult. That benefit continues to be enjoyed post-divorce by both parties. Thus if the contributions of effort to achieve that benefit are not equal (and the reader will have to accept that,
on average, women contribute more here), a benefit is conferred post-divorce.
Such a benefit requires some settling, just as an advanced degree, for example,
requires settling.
More significantly, care of children and the elderly is not the only nonfinancial aspect of the marital exchange, though it is the only one that the ALI
25
recognizes. Other aspects include counseling and emotional support of spouse
and family, and entertainment. Perhaps we should assume that the ALI leaves
these out on the principle that once you remove caregiving work per se, the rest
of the emotional exchanges within marriage are equal, and require no account19. Id. § 5.02 cmt. c.
20. Id. § 5.06.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Though ordinarily parents do not experience equal pleasure in the case of a present versus
and absent child, this does not undermine the point; most parents experience some benefit from the
existence and care of an absent child as well.
25. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 1, § 5.06.
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ing. This equal flow assumption is expressed in the Principles’ “give-and-take”
26
terminology. However, this may be a dubious assumption for several reasons.
First, there is a case to be made that women provide more counseling support during marriage, based on the (admittedly controversial) work of Carol
27
Gilligan and similar sociologists. More concretely, there is evidence that a
man’s emotional well-being improves when he is married, while a woman’s de28
clines when she is married. Finally, increasingly sound evidence suggests that
women seek divorce more often than men, suggesting that something about the
exchange is more often unsatisfactory to women than it is to men. It is hard to
get a concrete read on how each or any of these facts reflect on the exchange of
losses and benefits within or after marriage. But this gender correlation suggests
that we need to investigate the systemic effects of ignoring them in divorce settlements. We cannot safely chalk up nonfinancial gains and losses to the giveand-take of marriage. My suspicion is that the rise in male psychological wellbeing within marriage and the decline in female well-being indicates that the
flow of benefits is unequal, including all things financial and nonfinancial, and
that, on average, women are contributing more and receiving less during marriage. This suspicion is bolstered by the information that women, more often
29
than men, leave marriage.
If gender is the issue, my observation can be turned on its head; men suffer
greater nonfinancial losses from divorce (losing the male psychological wellbeing that results from marriage) while women suffer greater financial losses.
Therefore, compensating financial but not nonfinancial losses from divorce
benefits women, on average. However, that conclusion only follows if you accept another tenet of the Principles, expressed in Section 5.02 Comment c; the
only legally cognizable losses are those that arise from dissolution itself, not
from the marriage. The ALI justifies this approach with the following words:
[The remedies] are not meant to provide compensation for inequities in the
spousal give-and-take during the marriage. Divorcing individuals are likely to
believe that the allocation of resources and responsibilities during their marriage
was unfair. It would seem certain that some are correct. But the divorce law
cannot provide general relief for unfair conduct in marriage. . .The no-fault di-

26.
27.

Id. § 5.02 cmt. c.
CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S
DEVELOPMENT (1982).
28. E.g., Nadine F. Marks, Flying Solo at Midlife: Gender, Marital Status, and Psychological WellBeing, 58 J. MARRIAGE & THE FAM. 917, 930 (1996).
29. Women are remarrying at a lower rate than their ex-husbands. See Margaret F. Brinig and
Douglas W. Allen, These Boots are Made for Walking: Why Most Divorce Filers are Women, 2 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 126, 128 (2000). This has often been presented as evidence to support the injustice done
to the wife by the divorce; her prospects for remarriage must be worse given the gendered social
significance of age in our culture. It is plausible, however, that women’s lower remarriage rate is a
reflection of their preference. In the abstract, women may wish to remarry, but in light of the experience of their first marriage, are unwilling to accept many potential mates. Given the differential data
on marital happiness for men and women, it is hard to know whether to characterize that state of
affairs as a loss or a gain. Except where there has been violence in the household, the scenario of
women choosing and significantly benefiting from remaining unmarried or divorcing has not been
adequately investigated in the literature addressing marital dissolution, and its implications are not
well fleshed out in the Principles of Family Dissolution.
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vorce law of most states gives spouses the legal power to terminate the marriage
unilaterally. In principle this power makes it impossible for either spouse to im30
pose an inequitable arrangement on the other, at least in the long term.

This passage is dependent on several questionable assumptions. First,
there is a belief in he-said, she-said fatalism; the truth about equities is not susceptible to investigation. There is room for women to be skeptical of that position, just as women have been skeptical of it in the context of sex offenses and
domestic violence. This is not an exception; the presumptive fairness (or equality) of gains and losses within marriage is the very basis for ignoring them in divorce settlements. This fairness is proved to the ALI by the power each spouse
has, “in principle,” to prevent inequitable arrangements using divorce. Thus, the
emotional score sheet becomes one of who benefits from the divorce, or loses
and gains from it, not who benefited from the marriage.
The power to exit should not satisfy women as a safeguard against inequitable flow of benefits during marriage. It is inaccurate as an expression of what
is expected from contracting parties generally. Inequitable arrangements, measured as a fair divide of the surplus created by the alliance, can be and often are
sustained in long-term contracts. Even if exit were easy, the proper comparison
is not between the benefits received by each party, but between the benefits received by one party and her alternatives outside the marriage. These will not be
the same thing where the marriage produces a surplus of benefits to be divided
between two people. The benefits can be persistently divided unequally, “inequitably,”—ninety-five percent to one party and five percent to the other, so long
as that five percent represents an improvement over the alternative outside the
marriage. In other words, there must be a surplus over singleness created by the
marriage. Thus there is no reason to assume, as a starting point, that the exchange within marriage must be equitable (on some plausible meaning of that
31
term ) because it is policed by the exit power. This claim is identical to the
claim that the employment at-will doctrine ensures that employment arrangements are fair, and the claim is subject to the same normative and practical criticisms. Moreover, even if the alternatives outside marriage are better, an inequitable marriage can hold together where the actual barrier to exit—the legal and
psychological process of divorce—is great enough. This can be compounded
where an assessment of the interests of third parties, such as children, influences
the exit decision and it is not simply a question of personal utility.
These may sound like unrealistic rational theory niceties, but they are potentially significant to the justice of the divorce system. Under the Principles, the
nonfinancial incidents are not to be measured at all because they are ephemeral,
stripping someone who contributes more nonfinancial benefits of an accounting
32
of her contributions to the marriage. The give-and-take exchanges during marriage, as distinct from the losses created by divorce, are not to be measured because they are a presumptively balanced wash. I would posit that the give-andtake within marriage is not presumptively balanced, and that this imbalance
30. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 1, § 5.02 cmt. c.
31. The most that could be said is that the distribution within marriage is sure to be “efficient,”
as distinct from fair, but even this claim is questionable.
32. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 1, § 5.02 cmt. b.
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needs to be addressed. The drafters of the Principles might at this point argue
that this analysis drifts too close to the shores of fault determinations. However,
it is not clear that nonfinancial losses need to be equated entirely with fault; they
need not arise solely from “misconduct” of any sort, cognizable in tort or more
mundane. While I am not an advocate of moralistic determinations of fault, the
possibility that fault can be a mechanism for evaluating inequities in nonfinancial give-and-take must be considered.
IV. INCOMMENSURABILITY
The Principles argue that nonfinancial losses are excluded in part because
they cannot be translated onto the scale of financial losses and traded-off against
them. Specifically, Comment b to Section 5.02 says:
The reasons for this exclusion are pragmatic as well as principled. The pains and
joys that individuals find from divorce are not commensurable with its financial
costs, so that there is no method for determining the extent to which compensation for a financial loss should be reduced or enlarged to reflect nonfinancial
33
gains or losses.

As an initial matter, one must agree that translating non-monetary suffering into dollars is problematic. However, we should look harder before disposing of the issue on that ground alone. First, is it harder to translate nonfinancial
marital losses into dollars than in a multitude of other areas, such as pain and
suffering in tort law? The legal system does this translation routinely, and therefore it cannot stand alone as a reason to deny a remedy for nonfinancial losses.
The reason the difficult translation to dollars is undertaken in tort is because to
do otherwise would be unjust and the effect would be to ignore genuine wrongful suffering because there are imperfections and limitations in our ability to address the suffering. In tort, the course of overcoming the imperfections frankly
acknowledges that the suffering is too great to ignore. Therefore, implicit in a
decision that the valuation is too difficult here is a political decision—the pain
isn’t worth the gain. When incommensurability is translated into eliminating
one side of the equation from consideration, a political move is made in labeling
a loss incommensurable. What is meant is that the loss is not worthy of addressing. In the ALI context, we need to view the decision to ignore nonfinancial losses as an assessment that they are not terribly important. However, this
perspective on the exchanges within marriage should be rejected because it may
have gender-biased implications.
The ALI’s resolution of this problem is to offer up the regular tort system as
34
an alternative to the divorce proceeding itself, but it is very hard to conceive of
a principled reason to delegate that function. Rather it appears to be delegated
as a part of the process of minimizing its significance. The Introduction to the
Principles, in Topic 2, Section III, says as much. The Principles concede that putting tort litigation within the marital dissolution would “facilitate such claims by
35
lowering the procedural or transactional hurdles that confront them.” Never33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id. § 5.02.
Id. Introduction at 28.
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theless, the Principles go on to explain that, in effect, having the tort option is a
way of getting rid of the problems raised here as a conceptual matter only; in
practice, these tort claims will, by and large, not be brought. In the further discussion of how the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress would work
for ordinary marital losses, the Principles praise the extent to which there would
36
usually not be a remedy for such losses. In other words, the Principles at first
appear to point to a forum for nonfinancial losses to be investigated—tort law—
37
but note approvingly that tort law will only apply to outrageous behavior.
Thus, the ALI makes the conclusion that the ordinary financial losses are in fact
the important ones, or the ones worthy of legal relevance.
In any event, tort is not the right avenue for examining nonfinancial losses
precisely because they are not extraordinary; they are a significant part of marriage and marital dissolution. This is because the marriage bargain itself thoroughly intertwines financial and nonfinancial obligations, and the attempt to
disentangle them at divorce in order to achieve neatness does not do a service to
the reality of the marriage relationship. When thinking about gender questions
and the Principles, women should at least be concerned that the Principles have
effectively created property rights in earning capacity and goods, and not cre38
ated property rights in other sacrifices made on behalf of the marriage.
If it is not harder to translate nonfinancial matters of marriage into financial
awards in theory than it is in tort law, then the objection is misstated in Comment b to Section 5.02. Rather than being about the difficulty of translating dollars into non-dollar values, the real concern is about ascertaining the comparative suffering between spouses. It is the he-said, she-said concern, the no-fault
value. Put differently, it is about the desire not to ask and not to investigate,
rather than about the actual question of remedial translation into dollars. The
difference may seem obscure, but imagine that one party had suffered far more
than the other—pick a clear case (Spouse A philanders constantly, drinks, does
nothing for the marriage, does not work, and Spouse B is long-suffering and
generally a compromising person to live with). The real difficulty—deciding
whose lot is worse—would not be as hard as in most divorces. Thus, the further
act of translating Spouse B’s greater suffering into dollars (i.e. onto a different
metric) would be a difficult task, but one well within the regular practice of the
legal system. It is the closer case of comparative suffering that raises concern.
However, I believe that the actual concern in this situation is more about deciding whose losses are greater—evaluating the content of the give-and-take—and
less about translating that evaluation onto a financial metric.
That is not to say the ALI is wrong to worry about assessing the comparative losses. But the issue should not be stated as an incommensurability problem. Rather, it collapses into the desire to avoid fault adjudication.

36.
37.
38.

Id. at 29, 42, 49-50.
Id. at 32, 42, 49-50.
For a complete discussion of this problem, see Silbaugh, supra note 15, at 65.
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V. FAULT
There is now a reasonable consensus that fault-based grounds for divorce
are not sound, to the extent they purport to limit the availability of divorce.
However, the problems presented by nonfinancial issues suggest why fault in
the context of financial resolutions is not as easily shaken off as the Principles
would like. The Principles are deeply committed to eradicating any last vestiges
of a fault role in deciding anything at the time of divorce. For example, Comment b to Section 5.02 says that a primary reason for not considering nonfinancial losses is that “to include consideration of emotional losses and gains would
require a more general examination of marital misconduct, which this section
39
rejects.” The reason for not permitting marrying spouses to sign enforceable
agreements limiting their own divorce options to fault grounds is that courts
would then have to “polic[e] the details of intimate relationships,” a task the
Principles avoid with the rejection of all fault inquiries.
Maybe the investigation into fault can be richer and more reasoned than
the Principles claim when they call fault issues questions of “morality, virtue,
40
and sin.” Inquiries into marital fault need not be inquiries into morality, virtue,
and sin. By using these concepts, the Principles have turned concrete nonfinancial items of reciprocal exchange into abstractions. Nonfinancial aspects of marriage, rather than representing the concrete flow of welfare-enhancing services,
become the two-dimensional material of moral judgment and, in the process,
become conceptual, not actual. This is the mistake of conflating nonfinancial
contributions and losses with misconduct.
At times, the Principles express concern that inquiries into fault are standardless and leave room for dangerous evaluations on the part of individual
judges. This seems a valid concern. But are we certain that consideration of conduct cannot be a vehicle for capturing legitimate inequities in nonfinancial exchanges? Given the valid concern over creating standards for judging nonfinancial losses and gains, the conclusion that nonfinancial losses and concerns are
therefore incompensable is not the only one available. The Principles have very
carefully created a language of compensable losses to rid the legal air of concepts such as need, for example. Perhaps the Principles could have crafted some
concrete language to take nonfinancial losses seriously. Perhaps fault could
have been re-labeled and similarly refocused, from morality and misconduct to
an evaluation of the entire marital balance sheet, both financial and nonfinancial,
in exchange terms. These questions are unanswerable, because all the evidence
suggests that the justice import of the nonfinancial losses goes unappreciated
throughout the Principles. Maybe there could not be a reworking of fault to take
account of the interaction of financial and nonfinancial gains and losses within
marriage. If so, must nonfinancial gains and losses be left out of court altogether? Maybe the ALI should have pressed harder on whether avoiding inquiries into virtue and sin necessarily forecloses inquiries into ordinary nonfinancial incidents of marriage.

39.
40.

ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 1, § 5.02 cmt. b.
Id. Introduction at 28-29.
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VI. AN ADDITIONAL MATTER
The ALI has acknowledged the unusual challenge of putting together the
Principles given the degree of inconsistency in the law over time, from state to
41
state and from judge to judge. The difficulty of articulating the Principles at a
time of extraordinary transition in family life is even more striking. Marriage
rates are down, and marriage is no longer a societal pre-condition of having
children; roughly one third of children are born to unmarried mothers. Marriage is not necessary to oblige parents (fathers) to their children. It is not necessary as a condition of liberal access to sexual activity. It no longer provides financial security. The Principles acknowledge that there is little consensus about
42
what the meaningful content of marriage is at this time. Yet the Principles in
general seem to reflect on and organize the major debates and changes of the
past 30 years as if we are nearing the end of the period of change. This does not
seem obvious. Signs that change has slowed significantly are not apparent. A
leveling of the divorce rate does not necessarily reveal much about the content
of newly negotiated family arrangements. Instead, the Principles may be poorly
timed in this process of family change.

41.
42.

Id. Introduction at 1-8.
Id. at 22-26.

